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ABSTRACT
Currency crises are usually associated with large real depreciations. In some countries real depreci-
ations are perceived to be very costly ("fear of ﬂoating"). In this paper we try to understand the
reasons behind this fear. We ﬁrst look at episodes of currency crises in the ’90s and establish that
countries entering a crisis with high levels of foreign debt tend to experience large real exchange
rate overshooting (devaluation in addition of the long run equilibrium level) and large output con-
tractions. We develop a model of currency crises that helps explain this evidence. The key element
of the model is the presence of a margin constraint on the domestic country. Real devaluations,
by reducing the value of domestic assets relative to international liabilities, make countries with
high foreign debt more likely to hit the constraint. When countries hit the constraint they are
forced to sell domestic assets and this causes a further devaluation of the currency (overshooting)
and a reduction of their stock prices (overreaction). This ﬁre sale can have a signiﬁcant negative
wealth eﬀect. The model highlights a key tradeoﬀ when considering ﬁxed v/s ﬂexible regime; a ﬁxed
exchange regime can, by avoiding exchange rate overshooting, mitigate the negative wealth eﬀect
but at the cost of additional distortions and output drops in the short run. There are plausible
parameter values under which ﬁxed exchange rates dominate ﬂexible.
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Currency crises are usually associated with large real exchange rate depreciations. In some
countries these real depreciations are perceived to be very costly (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002, call it
“fear of ﬂoating”). In this paper we try to understand some of the reasons behind this fear.
Several recent episodes of currency crises in emerging markets (such as Mexico, Thailand,
Korea, Indonesia, Russia, Brazil, Turkey and Argentina) have had a number of common features.
Speciﬁcally, collapses of ﬁxed exchange rate regimes have been associated with a sudden stop of
capital inﬂows into the country and a sharp short-run overshooting of the nominal and real exchange
rate well above their fundamental value; only over the medium run have the real exchange rates
shown a tendency to return to their long-run equilibrium values. A similar pattern is observed
for asset prices: stock markets fall sharply and their foreign currency values overshoot their long
run values; only over time does the real value of stocks recover. Moreover, while economic theory
suggests that depreciations should have stimulated demand and output through their eﬀects on
competitiveness, many currency crises have been associated with short-run sharp output contractions
rather than economic expansions.
A key piece of evidence, to be shown below, suggests that the overshooting of exchange rates,
the sudden stop of capital ﬂows and the output drop can be related to the size of foreign currency
debt of the country (the degree of liability dollarization), pointing to the important role of balance
sheet eﬀects in explaining the currency behavior and the output response. Speciﬁcally, it appears
that large foreign currency debt, and the need to hedge open foreign currency positions once a
peg breaks, may be behind the overshooting of exchange rates and of stock prices observed once
the peg collapses. In turn, such currency overshooting (beyond what is the required to adjust an
overvalued/misaligned currency) interacts with the existence of a large amount of foreign currency
debt to create large balance sheet eﬀects on ﬁrms, banks and governments (and the ﬁre sale ofequity assets to reduce exposure to such foreign currency liabilities) that are behind the severity
of the output contraction. After establishing this evidence in a more formal way, by estimating a
joint relation between foreign debt, overshooting and output contractions, we go on to develop an
analytical framework that explains the overshooting phenomenon and can be used to evaluate the
costs of a currency crisis in a country with a high level of foreign currency debt. The key mechanism
of the model is the presence of a margin constraint (as in Aiyagari and Gertler, 1999) imposed on
the domestic country. We ﬁnd the margin constraint a simple and convenient way of modeling the
sudden stop of capital inﬂows and the subsequent portfolio adjustment.
We model a crisis as a shock that forces both a depreciation of the real exchange rate and an
adjustment of the portfolio holdings of the country. If in the wake of the crisis the country abandons
the peg there will be an immediate depreciation of the real exchange rate. The fall in the value of the
currency makes the margin constraint more likely to bind (the greater is the stock of initial foreign
currency debt) and thus forces the country to sell domestic stocks to buy back some of its external
debt. The stock selloﬀ further depresses domestic stock prices relative to the foreign currency debt
making the margin constraint even more binding. The ﬁnal eﬀect of the move to a ﬂoat is a large
depreciation (with balance sheet eﬀects) and a net loss of wealth because of the ﬁre sale of assets. In
this paper we use a model and the empirical evidence to show that these costs might be substantial.
The paper also suggest that, in face of real shocks and margin constraints, it could be better to
maintain a peg, at least for a period, as a temporary peg would reduce the distortionary pressure of
the margin constraint. This complements a recent literature on balance sheet eﬀects and currency
regimes suggesting that ﬂexible exchange rates are superior to ﬁxed exchange rates even once one
takes into consideration the balance sheet eﬀects of liability dollarization (Céspedes, Chang and
Velasco, 2000, and Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci, 2000). These studies ﬁnd that ﬂexible exchange
rate regimes dominate ﬁxed rate regimes even when one considers the balance sheet eﬀects deriving
2from liability dollarization. The intuition for this result is simple: if an external shock -such as an
increase in the world interest rate or a fall in the demand for exports - requires a real devaluation,
such devaluation can occur in two ways: (a) via a nominal depreciation under ﬂex exchange rates; or
(b) via a domestic deﬂation under ﬁxed exchange rates. Thus, under both regimes there are going to
be negative balance sheet eﬀects when a shock hits the economy; these eﬀects imply contractions in
output under both regimes. However, under ﬁxed rates the output eﬀects of the shock will be larger
because, if nominal wages are rigid, deﬂation exacerbates the contraction in output and employment.
Our paper shares the same elements of those papers but adds a type of ﬁnancial friction, the margin
constraint. This mechanism makes it more worthwhile for policymakers to keep the real exchange
ﬁxed, and thus it generates a meaningful trade-oﬀ between ﬁxed and ﬂexible regimes.
This paper is also related to a recent analytical literature on balance sheet eﬀects and output
contractions.2 This literature has stressed the role of “balance sheet eﬀects” in explaining the
contractionary eﬀects of depreciations: when liabilities are in foreign currency while assets are in
local currency, a real depreciation has sharp balance sheet eﬀects that can lead to a ﬁrm’s illiquidity,
ﬁnancial distress and, in the extreme, bankruptcy; in these papers, the output eﬀects of depreciations
are modeled as deriving from “ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀects” on investment.
Regarding the empirical literature, there is still little work on the output eﬀects of cur-
rency crises. Contributions include Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000), and Gupta, Mishra and Sahay
(2001).3 These studies use a much larger data set than our paper as they consider: (a) crises in the
1970s-1990s period rather than just the 1990s, as this paper does; (b) take a very broad deﬁnition
of a currency crisis that includes not only the breaks of pegs but also modest depreciations under
2See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Krugman (1999), Aghion, Banerjee and Bacchetta (2000), Céspedes, Chang and
Velasco (2000), Caballero and Krishnamurty (2002), Christiano, Gust and Roldos (2002) and Mendoza (2002).
3Ahmed, Gust, Kamin and Huntley (2002) ﬁnd for a sample of selected developing economies that real exchange
rate devaluations tend to be contractionary. However, their results suggest the cause of the perverse eﬀects of a
devaluation is not the abandonment of a peg per se, but rather the interaction between the change in the exchange
rate regime and the structural characteristics of developing economies.
3semi-ﬂexible exchange rates; and (c) consider both countries with capital account restrictions and
those open to international capital markets. As we like to concentrate on the balance sheet eﬀects of
sudden and sharp reduction in currency values in economies open to international capital markets,
we have a much smaller sample that covers only the crises since the 1990s. Gupta, Mishra and Sa-
hay (2001) ﬁnd that crises that are preceded by large capital inﬂows, that occur at the height of an
economic boom, under a relatively free capital mobility regime, and in countries that trade less with
the rest of the world, are more likely to be contractionary in the short-run. These results conﬁrm
and extend results found by Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000). Our empirical study below uses a
similar set of regressors but concentrates on the eﬀects of liability dollarization and its interaction
with exchange rate overshooting. While a measure of liability dollarization was not signiﬁcant in the
Gupta, Mishra and Sahay (2001), we ﬁnd that such a variable is highly signiﬁcant and dominates
alternative regressors in the output regression.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the stylized facts regarding
exchange rate overshooting, balance sheet exposure and output contraction during crisis episodes
and establishes their links through a simultaneous equation estimation. Section 3 presents a basic
model of overshooting and our numerical results. Section 4 concludes.
2. Empirical Analysis
In this section we present our main empirical ﬁndings. As the object of our investigation
is the behavior of the real exchange rate after a crisis, our ﬁrst task is to identify currency crises
episodes in the data. We restrict our analysis to the last decade and to countries with reasonably
liberalized capital accounts.4 We examine all countries in the JPMorgan real eﬀective exchange rate
universe and obtain monthly nominal exchange rate series in local currency versus the US dollar or
4We focus on what Dornbusch (2001) has called new style crises, whose central aspect is the focus of balance sheet
and capital ﬂights. This type of crisis is typical of the 1990s.
4the DM (for Euro area countries). We deﬁne depit as the 3-month nominal depreciation in month t
for country i and we identify period t as the start of a crisis if the following two conditions are met
• depit >10% and depit − depit−3 >10%
• An oﬃcial peg or crawling peg broke
These criteria leave us with 23 crisis episodes, and the countries and crisis dates are reported
in Table 1.5
We deﬁne fundamental depreciation as the weakening of the real eﬀective exchange rate
(REER) that brings the exchange rate back to equilibrium, while overshooting is any weakening
above and beyond the fundamental depreciation. Specifying an equilibrium REER will enable us to
measure these two components of total depreciation. We assume that when a country begins to ex-
perience a crisis, its REER may be overvalued, but that after the crisis, the REER eventually adjusts
to its equilibrium level. Indeed, in the episodes we study, the post-crisis REERs tend to stabilize at
a level about 16% weaker than their pre-crisis values. The amount of time that elapses before the
exchange rate stabilizes varies across countries, so for consistency across countries, we deﬁne the
REER prevailing 24 months after a crisis as the equilibrium level and we check the robustness of
this assumption later. We can now deﬁne fundamental depreciation as the percent deviation of the
equilibrium REER from the observed pre-crisis REER. In other words, the fundamental deprecia-
tion is equal to the ex ante misalignment of the REER. Overshooting is the additional depreciation
above and beyond fundamental depreciation, so it is measured as the percent deviation of the REER
at its weakest point during the 24 months following a crisis from the equilibrium level. Figures 1a,
1b and 1c report the path for the real eﬀective exchange rates for each crisis in our sample. We can
observe three patterns:
5These criteria are similar to the ones used by Frankel and Rose (1996).
5i) An “Asian style” crisis with large equilibrium devaluation and large overshooting; this is
observed for most Asian crises of 1997 and for other cases such as Mexico in 1994.
ii) A “European style” crisis with a relatively large equilibrium devaluation (around 20%)
but a very small overshooting; this pattern is observed for the European countries that experienced
a currency crisis during the 1992 EMS turbulence period.
iii) Crises with no substantial change in the long run value of the real exchange rate but with
overshooting that can be substantial (labeled “Other Style”). These episodes include India in 1995,
Bulgaria in 1998 and Israel in 1998.
Figure 2 provides evidence that crises episodes in countries with high net debt indeed resulted
in higher overshooting. More speciﬁcally, our measure of net debt includes all sectors’ foreign
currency obligations and nets out foreign currency assets of the banking system. Where possible,
we also net out foreign currency assets of the corporate sector. These data are generally not available
for the emerging markets in our sample, but are likely to be quite small relative to the other ﬁgures
involved for these countries. We do not net out the reserves of the monetary authority since these
assets will not necessarily be made available to agents wishing to hedge, and we test the robustness
of this assumption below.
So far we have shown that overshooting is related to net debt and in the model we will
argue that this relation arises because of a sharp adjustment of country portfolios during the crises.
Therefore crises with higher overshooting are, in sense to be made precise later, more costly. Another
reason for which large depreciation together with large debt is costly is the presence of so called
“balance sheet eﬀects”: devaluation in presence of large foreign currency liabilities can increase the
value of debt relative to revenues, crippling insuﬃciently hedged debtors and leading to business
failures and output contractions.
6To test that the output contraction is related to balance sheet eﬀects, we ﬁrst need to quantify
the severity of the output contraction. We use seasonally-adjusted quarterly GDP data for the 2
years following each crisis and deﬁne the output contraction as the percent deviation of the lowest
output level during that 2-year period from the pre-crisis output level. In this way, we capture the
worst of the crisis damage in each country without needing to control for diﬀerent speeds of exchange
rate pass-through across countries. For countries that do not experience a post-crisis contraction,
we use the (positive) percent deviation of the GDP level one year after the crisis from the pre-crisis
output level.
Finally, we need to measure balance sheet eﬀects. The logic behind the concept suggests
that the potential for balance sheet eﬀects should come from the increase in the real value of the
foreign debt to GDP ratio that is measured by the product of net debt position times the total
real exchange rate depreciation. Figure 3 indeed shows convincing evidence of a log-linear6 relation
between output contractions and debt/depreciation products, suggesting an important role for these
eﬀects.
Regression analysis
Now we provide a regression analysis of the empirical relation between net debt, overshooting
and output contraction. The equations we wish to estimate are of the following form.
overshooting = α1 + α2net_debt (1)
gdp_change = β1 + β2 log(net_debt · total_depreciation) (2)
A l lr e a le ﬀective exchange rates are measured so that increases are depreciations. We hy-
pothesize that α2 > 0, or that heavier debt burdens imply more overshooting, and we expect β2 < 0,
so that heavier debt burdens and more depreciation imply steeper contractions in output.
6Even though a log-linear relation provides a better statistical description of the relation, we ﬁnd a strong and
signiﬁcantly negative association between the two variables even when we use a simple linear relation.
7Ordinary Least Squares. In table 2 we present results obtained using estimating 1 and 2 sepa-
rately using ordinary least squares. The estimation results strongly support our hypotheses, despite
the relatively small size of the sample. Both α2 and β2 have the expected signs and are signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. Our ﬁndings imply that the heavier a country’s debt burden is (or the more
demand for hedging there is), the more overshooting one can expect during a crisis. Moreover, the
results support the view that the severity of a country’s post-crisis output contraction depends on
balance sheet eﬀects. The more depreciation a country experiences and the heavier its debt burden,
the deeper its post-crisis output contraction will be. The results from the OLS regression need
to be taken with caution, however, because of two potential problems: the small sample size and
endogeneity. We address these concerns below.
Small Sample Inference. Since our regressions are based on only 23 observations, a legitimate
concern is whether the asymptotic arguments that permit inference truly hold up in such a small
sample. As a check on our results, we re-estimate the coeﬃcients and derive standard errors using a
jackknife procedure. In particular, we compute the entire frequency distribution of the coeﬃcients
α2 and β2 excluding each episode singularly, all possible couples of episodes, all possible triples and
ﬁnally all possible quadruples.7 The distributions of the coeﬃcients α2 and β2, are reported in
ﬁgures 4 and 5, respectively. Notice that the coeﬃcients never take the wrong sign and that the
distribution is centered around the estimate using the full sample. Moreover, the jackknife standard
errors are even smaller than the OLS standard errors. We then conclude that our main empirical
ﬁndings are not biased by the small size of our sample.





8Endogeneity. One problem with using OLS to estimate equations 1 and 2 separately is that the
overshooting variable in equation 1 enters as part of the total depreciation variable in equations 2.
total_depreciation = fundamental+ overshooting +
fundamental∗ overshooting
100
Indeed, OLS estimation of the equations in either system separately will be inconsistent if
the covariance matrix of the residuals from the two equations is not diagonal; a non-diagonal
covariance matrix implies that the explanatory variables in the second equation are correlated with
the residuals from the same equation, violating the assumptions of OLS. To address this problem,
we use 3-stage least squares to estimate equations 1 and 2 as a system of simultaneous equations.
Three-stage least squares involves regressing the endogenous variable from the ﬁrst equation on a
set of instruments and then using the predicted values—rather than the original data—in estimating
the second equation.8 The results are reported in table 3. Notice that the coeﬃcients still have the
expected sign and they are still signiﬁcant at the 1% level, though the point estimates are slightly
diﬀerent from the OLS estimates. Quantitatively, an increase in a country’s net debt/GDP ratio by
10 percentage points increases overshooting by about 11.5%.
For example, suppose that a country has a net debt ratio and fundamental depreciation at
the average of our dataset, so that its fundamental depreciation is 16% and its net debt/GDP ratio
is 39%. Then our results imply that a 10 percentage point increase in an average country’s net
debt/GDP ratio yields an additional output contraction of 1.7%, through its direct eﬀect on output
and its indirect eﬀect through overshooting.
We can also measure the impact on output of changes in the other exogenous variable,
fundamental depreciation. According to our results, if the fundamental depreciation of an average
8We follow convention by including all the exogenous variables from the simultaneous equations system in our set
of instruments. Since the overshooting variable enters equation 2 in a non-linear way, we also include non-linear
functions of the exogenous variables in our sets of instruments as Kelejian (1971) recommends.
9country increases by 10 percentage points, we would expect output to contract by an additional
0.8%.
Since Argentina’s recent crisis has developed entirely outside of our sample period, we can
use our estimates to do a very simple exercise in out-of-sample prediction. Our model predicts that
with Argentina’s net debt/GDP ratio of 55%, the country can expect 50% overshooting, on top of
market estimates of 11% fundamental devaluation.9 If the market’s estimates of overvaluation are
on target, then our model predicts a maximum output contraction of 5.5% over the 2 years following
this hypothetical crisis. This prediction rests between the Argentine government’s prediction of a
5% contraction and market forecasts of a 7-10% output contraction.
Robustness Tests. Our hypothesis that foreign currency exposure and the ensuing hedging de-
mand fuels overshooting and that balance sheet eﬀects induce output contractions are, of course,
only one set of possible explanations for these phenomena.
It is possible overshooting will occur if there is substantial uncertainty about future monetary
policy or if agents are concerned that the monetary authorities will embark on a highly inﬂationary
program after a currency break, for example to ﬁnance the ﬁscal deﬁcits resulting from an output fall
and/or the costs of bailing out the ﬁnancial system.10 As agents gain conﬁdence that the monetary
authorities will adopt prudent policies, the real eﬀective exchange rate could recover over time to a
less depreciated level.
Alternatively, overshooting and output contraction might be the result of a liquidity run and
crunch in the immediate aftermath of a shock;11 if a country has a heavy short-term debt burden
or a high M2/reserves ratio, a liquidity run where agents attempt to liquidate debts and “dollarize”
9This is an estimate from Goldman Sachs (2001).
10Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999) develop a model where the currency crash and sharp depreciation are the
results of the need to monetize the ﬁscal costs of a banking crisis driven by moral hazard. Another variant of this
ﬁscal theory is in Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001).
11See Rodrik and Velasco (2000) and Sachs and Radelet (1999).
10cash assets might trigger a currency crisis and fuel overshooting; the ensuing liquidity crunch may
also sharply increase real interest rates and lead to a sharp fall in output.
Market participants12 have suggested that overshooting might also be driven by the size of
the external imbalance; if a country runs a very large current account deﬁcit relative to the size
of its economy, it might have more diﬃculty narrowing that deﬁcit than would a country with a
smaller current account/GDP ratio. According to a similar argument, countries that are more open
to trade as measured by trade/GDP ratios will ﬁnd it easier to balance the current account after
a crisis and therefore should experience less overshooting. It is important to note, however, that
a large current account to GDP ratio often mirrors substantial capital inﬂows. To the extent that
these pre-crisis inﬂows are debt, rather than equity, then the eﬀects of a large or protracted current
account deﬁcit may already be captured by the net debt to GDP variable.
As suggested by Calvo (1998) a “sudden stop” or a reversal of capital inﬂows could adversely
aﬀect output if less international credit is available to ﬁnance productive enterprises.13
A terms-of-trade shock concurrent with a crisis could adversely aﬀect a country’s output
because the shock would oﬀset the beneﬁcial competitiveness eﬀect of a devaluation on exports.14
Yet another possible explanation of overshooting and output contraction focuses on expan-
sions in bank credit and credit boom phenomena.15 During a boom, credit to the private sector
may expand as banks aggressively seek out new business and as the net worth of potential borrowers
rises. Once a crisis begins, however, the net worth of some borrowers collapses. To the extent that
these borrowers race to convert assets into foreign currency in order to protect themselves, they may
fuel overshooting. To the extent that these borrowers go bankrupt, an output contraction could
ensue.
12See Goldman Sachs (2000).
13See Calvo and Reinhart (1999) for some evidence on this hypothesis.
14See, for example Gupta, Mishra and Sahay (2001).
15See Gourinchas, Valdes and Landerrechte (2001) for a study of credit booms and their consequences.
11Finally, a sharp output fall may be the result of a banking crisis.16 Weaknesses in bank loan
portfolios before a crisis may be exacerbated by the balance sheet eﬀects of a devaluation when many
bank liabilities are in foreign currency. In this case, a sharp depreciation may trigger a banking
crisis, a credit crunch and a fall in economic activity.
O n ep o i n tt oo b s e r v ei st h a tt h e s ea l t e r n a t i v ee xplanations of overshooting and output con-
traction are not necessarily inconsistent with the balance sheet eﬀects that we stress in this paper.
For example, we explore the possibility that banking crises themselves are partly the result of bal-
ance sheet eﬀects; a mismatch in the currency composition of banks’ own assets and liabilities could
directly lead to bank failures, while similar mismatches on the books of corporate debtors could lead
to a deterioration of bank asset quality and could indirectly lead to bank failures. In cases like this,
the output eﬀects of the banking crisis are consistent with—and the consequence of—the balance sheet
argument presented in our paper.
This endogeneity (to the balance sheet eﬀects of a devaluation) is common to a number of the
alternative explanations of output contraction presented above. It is possible that a liquidity run
is not exogenous but driven by balance sheet eﬀects in the presence of short term foreign currency
debt. Similarly, sudden stops and capital ﬂow reversals may be triggered by the balance sheet eﬀects
of sharp devaluations, rather than being autonomous causes of an output fall. Or, in the presence
of currency mismatches, a reversal of capital ﬂows may depress the exchange rate and exacerbate
balance sheet eﬀects, thus contributing to a decline in output through the channels emphasized in
this paper.
Thus, keeping in mind that some of the alternative explanations of overshooting and output
contraction may be themselves a variant of a balance sheet story, we establish the robustness of our
model to these competing theories by re-estimating our model several times.
16See Mishkin (1999).
12First, we use the average annual inﬂation rate over the ﬁve years preceding a crisis as a
proxy for uncertainty about future monetary policy. If the monetary authorities’ commitment to
ﬁghting inﬂation has been checkered in the recent past, agents may have legitimate questions about
the future direction of policy. When we re-estimate the system with average inﬂa t i o ni nt h eﬁrst
equation, however, we ﬁnd that the inﬂation variable is not signiﬁcant and its inclusion does not
change the magnitude or signiﬁcance of the other coeﬃcients. This result suggests that uncertainty
about future monetary policy may not be driving overshooting.
Next, to test the hypothesis that a liquidity crunch drives overshooting and potentially exac-
erbates the output contraction, we calculate pre-crisis M2/reserves ratios and re-estimate our model
three times, with the added variable in the ﬁrst equation, in the second equation, and then in both
equations. M2/reserves is not signiﬁcant in any of these speciﬁcations, and the inclusion of this
variable does not aﬀect the explanatory power of the other explanatory variables. As a second
test of the liquidity crunch hypothesis, we compute pre-crisis short-term debt/reserves ratios and
include this variable in the ﬁrst equation, in the second equation, and then in both equations. Once
again, the competing explanation fails, as the short-term debt/reserves ratio is not signiﬁcant in
any of these speciﬁcations.17 In our ﬁnal test of the liquidity hypothesis, we include the pre-crisis
reserves/import ratio in the ﬁrst equation, in the second equation, and then in both equations.
Unsurprisingly, this traditional measure of foreign reserve adequacy is also insigniﬁcant in all three
speciﬁcations, and its inclusion in the regression still does not aﬀect the other coeﬃcients.
Next, to determine the role of current account imbalances and openness, we compute pre-
crisis current account/GDP and trade/GDP ratios and include these variables in our ﬁrst equation
separately and then together. These variables are never signiﬁcant in any of these three speciﬁca-
17Note that severeal analyses of early warning indicators of currency crises suggest that indicators of liquidity risk
help to predict the onset of crises. Here, we do not test whether liquidity mismatches aﬀect the probability of a currency
crisis. We instead test whether, given a currency crisis, its depth and intensity is aﬀected by liquidity variables.
13tions, and they do not aﬀect the coeﬃcients on the original explanatory variables.
Gupta, Mishra and Sahay (2001) test the idea that a “sudden stop” or reversal of capital
ﬂows can play a role in output by measuring the buildup of capital over a given period prior to the
crisis. Parallel to their method, we compute total capital inﬂo w sa sas h a r eo fG D Pi nt h et h r e e
years prior to each crisis and in the one year prior to each crisis. We then re-estimate our model
6t i m e s ,w i t he a c hv a r i a b l ei nt h eﬁrst equation, then the second equation, then in both equations.
The one-year capital buildup is signiﬁcant at the 10% level when it is included only in the second
equation, but it does not substantially aﬀect the coeﬃcient on balance sheet eﬀects. This result is
shown in Table 4. The 3-year capital buildup is a signiﬁcant determinant of output when included
only in equation 2 (Table 5) and when included in both equations (Table 6). While the 3-year capital
buildup does not aﬀect the signiﬁcance of the benchmark variables, its inclusion does increase the
sensitivity of output to balance sheet eﬀects; the coeﬃcient on balance sheet eﬀects rises by about
one standard deviation when the 3-year capital buildup is included in the model.
A better measure of the sudden stop or reversal of capital ﬂo w si st h ed i ﬀerence between
pre-crisis and post-crisis capital ﬂows. We compute the capital inﬂow in the 4 quarters following a
crisis and subtract the capital inﬂow in the 4 quarters preceding a crisis, then divide by pre-crisis
output to get a measure of the actual observed reversal in ﬁnancing ﬂows. We then include this
variable in the ﬁrst equation, in the second equation, and in both equations. Tables 7 and 6 indicate
that balance sheet eﬀects are an important determinant of output even after controlling for capital
reversal. When our version of the capital reversal variable is signiﬁcant, it does not change the
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients in the benchmark model, but it does slightly attenuate the impact of
balance sheet eﬀects on output.
Gupta, Mishra and Sahay (2001) also examine whether shifts in the terms of trade aﬀect
output during a crisis. Parallel to their method, we compute the percentage change in the terms
14of trade in the year after a crisis from the year before the crisis and include the variable in the
output equation. The change in the terms of trade is not signiﬁcant and does not aﬀect the other
coeﬃcients.
To explore the theory that recent credit expansions may play a role in driving overshooting
or output contractions in a crisis, we use the methodology developed in Gourinchas, Valdes, and
Landerretche (2001) and measure the relative and absolute deviation of actual bank credit to the
private sector from the trend credit level in each country just prior to the crisis. For both the
relative deviation and absolute deviation measures, we re-estimate our model three times, with the
added variable in the ﬁrst equation, in the second equation, and then in both equations. The credit
boom variables are never signiﬁc a n ta n dt h e yd on o ta ﬀect the coeﬃcients on the other variables
substantially.
We also explore the idea that a sharp contraction in real bank credit to the private sector
could fuel overshooting or exacerbate an output contraction. We measure this change in credit over
the one year following each crisis, then over the two years following each crisis, and include the
variable in the ﬁrst equation, in the second equation, andt h e ni nb o t he q u a t i o n s . T h eo n e - y e a r
variable is never signiﬁcant, but the two-year change in real private sector credit is signiﬁcant when
included in both equations, as shown in Table 9. The inclusion of this variable slightly attenuates
the coeﬃcients on the benchmark variables, but it does not aﬀect their signiﬁcance.
While testing for the eﬀects of banking crises on output, we found a signiﬁcant endogeneity
problem. In our sample, there are 12 cases of twin crises, when a currency crisis is concurrent with a
banking crisis. In many of these episodes it is clear from the history of events that the banking crisis
was triggered in part by the balance sheet eﬀects of currency mismatches in the banking system
and/or corporate system. When banks are net foreign currency debtors, a sharp fall in the home
currency’s value leads to sharp balance sheet eﬀects and ﬁnancial distress. Even if banks try to hedge
15by borrowing in foreign currency and lending in foreign currency to corporations and households,
the exchange rate is risk only transferred to the non-ﬁnancial private sector. Then, if a currency
crisis occurs, mismatched households and ﬁrms become distressed and default on their obligations to
local banks, thus triggering a banking crisis. In this way, banking crises can be triggered directly or
indirectly by the balance sheet eﬀects of sharp currency movements. To test for this, we estimated
a simple probit model of banking crisis where a banking crisis dummy variable is regressed on our
measure of balance sheet eﬀects. In one regression, the banking crisis dummy variable takes the
value 1 whenever there is a concurrent banking crisis. In another regression, the dummy variable
takes the value 1 only if the banking crisis erupted after the onset of the currency crisis. These
results are reported in Tables 10 and 11. In both regressions, the balance sheet variable has a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of a banking crisis. Thus, while regressions that include the
banking crisis dummy in the output equation do suggest that a banking crisis has a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on output, our results imply that the impact of the banking crisis can be traced back to balance
sheet eﬀects: an output contraction can be driven in part by a banking crisis that is the result of the
balance sheet eﬀects of a devaluation. Banks fail because they are exposed to direct and indirect
balance sheet eﬀects, and when bank failures lead to a credit crunch, output falls as a result.
Most emerging markets with open capital markets have liberalized capital ﬂows fairly recently,
and therefore the set of currency crises that are of interest to this study is quite small. Indeed, our
small sample size of only 23 crises raises the concern that erratic real exchange rate behavior in
one or two countries may have substantial inﬂuence over the coeﬃcient estimates or the standard
errors. To test the robustness of the model to outliers, we ﬁrst identify outliers by re-estimating
the model 23 times, once without each observation. At each iteration, we compute standardized
residuals in each equation for the included 22 variables and we compute a “predicted” residual for
the observation that was omitted. In this way, we can look for unusual observations whose outlier
16status is masked by the fact that the observation has substantially altered the coeﬃcient estimates.
We then look for standardized residuals from equations 1 or 2 that are greater than 1.65 in absolute
value in any of the 23 re-estimations. It turns out that 5 crisis episodes have outlying residuals under
these criteria: Turkey 1993, India 1995, Bulgaria 1996, Indonesia 1997, and Brazil 1999. We then
re-estimate the benchmark system 31 times, excluding all possible combinations of these 5 potential
outlier countries. Our results are highly robust to these outliers. The coeﬃcients of interest vary in
magnitude a bit, but they are always statistically signiﬁcant at least at the .02 level.
Our model does not explicitly account for any kind of competitiveness eﬀect, according
to which a currency depreciation makes a country’s exports cheaper and imports more expensive
relative to world prices, so that a corresponding rise in exports and fall in imports gives a boost to
GDP and mitigates the contractionary balance sheet eﬀects. To test the idea that competitiveness
eﬀects are important, we include total depreciation alone (linearly and not interacted with net
debt) in the second equation and report these results in Table 12. While the coeﬃcient on total
depreciation is highly signiﬁcant, it has the wrong sign for a competitiveness eﬀect. According to
our results, the more depreciation a country experiences, the greater the output contraction will be,
at odds with the competitiveness story.
World growth may play some role in the degree of output contraction following a crisis; coun-
tries that experience crisis when the world market is booming could ﬁnd it easier to recover, whereas
when small country crises coincide with world recession, weak foreign demand could exacerbate a
recession. To test this idea, we compute world growth over the two years following a crisis and
add this variable to the output equation. Table 13 shows that while world growth is signiﬁcant, its
inclusion does not aﬀect the other coeﬃcients substantially.
Finally, we test the robustness of our variable deﬁnitions. First, we change the net debt
deﬁnition by netting out government assets in addition to banking system and corporate external
17assets. Our benchmark model holds up under the alternate deﬁnition of net debt/GDP, as shown
in Table 14.
The net debt/GDP ratio is only a proxy for the potential hedging demand during a crisis, and
this measure might not be valid if debtors already hedge their net foreign currency obligations using
oﬀ-balance-sheet FX derivative contracts. In the absence of detailed information on the actual
hedging behavior of net debtors in each country, the spread between local currency and foreign
currency bonds could also be informative about hedging behavior. The larger this spread is, the
more expensive it may be for agents to hedge foreign currency obligations, and the more remiss they
may be in doing so. Thus, a large spread could represent another source of overshooting. When
we include the spread in equation 1, however, its coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant and does not aﬀect the
other coeﬃcients of interest.
Finally, we change our deﬁnition of the equilibrium real eﬀective exchange rate. First, we
redeﬁne the equilibrium as the REER that prevails 36 months after a crisis. As shown in Table 15,
both α2 and β2 retain the expected signs and are signiﬁcant at the .001 level. We then redeﬁne the
equilibrium as the average REER that prevails during the ﬁve years surrounding a crisis, speciﬁcally
the three years preceding and two years following a crisis, and report results in Table 16. Once again,
α2 and β2 have the expected signs and remain signiﬁcant at the .01 level, though α2 drops a bit
from 1.2 to 0.8. Finally, we experiment with measuring overshooting as the sum of deviations of the
REER from the equilibrium level over the 24 months following the crisis. We also try measuring
total depreciation by calculating the percent deviation of the REER from the t0 l e v e li ne a c hm o n t h
and then summing over the 24 months that follow a crisis. These measures of depreciation account
for the idea that an overshooting that lasts for a day or two may not have the same eﬀect on an
economy as an overshooting that lasts for months or years. Because these measures of depreciation
are substantially diﬀerent from those in the benchmark model, the coeﬃcients on the redeﬁned
18variables in Tables 17-18 change substantially, but the signs are correct and the intuition remains
the same: a heavier net debt burden implies a greater expected overshooting, and greater balance
sheet eﬀects imply a deeper output contraction. There is a potential problem with our use of
post-crisis data to measure the equilibrium REER, however. For our model to be econometrically
identiﬁed, both of our instruments—net debt and fundamental depreciation—must be exogenous. Yet
it is theoretically possible that fundamental depreciation could be partly endogenous in our model.
For example, if the degree of overshooting, the size of the debt, or the output contraction induces
a government policy in the initial stages of a crisis that changes the equilibrium REER, then our
speciﬁcation might not be valid. To ensure that fundamental depreciation is not endogenous, we
run regress fundamental depreciation on overshooting, net debt, and output contraction, and we
ﬁnd that these variables are never signiﬁcant. To eliminate the timing problem altogether, we
also redeﬁne the equilibrium REER as the average REER during the 5 years preceding a crisis and
then re-run our benchmark IV regression. With this redeﬁnition, fundamental depreciation is fully
determined prior to the crisis, and cannot be endogenously determined by deve l o p m e n t sa st h ec r i s i s
unfolds. Our results hold up under this alternate deﬁnition of fundamental depreciation.
In summary, our results and robustness tests establish that the extent of overshooting is
related to a country’s foreign currency debt burden (or the implicit demand for hedging during a
crisis) and that the contractionary eﬀect of a crisis is related to a country’s vulnerability to balance
sheet eﬀects.
3. A simple model of real exchange rate overshooting
In this section we discuss a simple model of currency crisis in order to better understand the
mechanism that links the overshooting of the exchange rates to the level of foreign debt. The model
is a simpliﬁed version of the model presented by Céspedes et al. (2000) or by Gertler et al. (2000),
with the addition of a particular type of ﬁnancial imperfection, namely margin constraints. We also
19ﬁnd the model useful to analyze the choice of exchange rate regime in an environment with margin
constraints. In this subsection we focus on a real economy that can be interpreted as a monetary
economy with ﬂexible exchange rates.
We consider a small open economy that produces a homogeneous good that can be used for




where u is a well behaved utility function, G is a CES aggregator of domestic and foreign consump-
tion, cH,t and cF,t are domestic consumption of the home and foreign goods and lt is labor used in
the production of the home good. Output of the domestic good yt is produced by ﬁrms using labor
with a decreasing returns to scale technology
yt = lα
t , 0 <α<1.
Firms are owned by domestic consumers and foreigners and their stocks are traded internationally.
In the rest of the paper we are going to normalize the price of the home good to 1 and denote by pt
the price of the foreign good relative to the home good (the real exchange rate is then proportional
to pt).
The domestic representative consumer maximizes expected utility subject to the following
constraints
wtlt +( qt + dt)st + ptbt − cH,t − cF,tpt −
ptbt+1
Rt
− qtst+1 ≥ 0, (3)
ptbt+1
Rt
+ κtqtst+1 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ κt ≤ 1, (4)
and to initial conditions for s0 and b0.The ﬁrst equation is a standard budget constraint (all in units
of the local good) where dt are the dividends paid by the ﬁrms, wt is the real wage , st are the
stocks of ﬁrms owned by domestic households, qt is the price of this stock, bt is the stock of foreign
20assets of the household sector and R is the (exogenous) interest rate that domestic consumers face
on the international market. The second equation represents what Aiyagari and Gertler (1999)
call a “margin constraint”. The assumption underlying the margin constraint is the existence of
ad o m e s t i cﬁnancial sector which holds the ﬁnancial assets and liabilities of the country. At each
point in time the debt (−
ptbt+1
Rt ) to assets (qtst+1) ratio of the ﬁnancial sector has to be below a
certain threshold κt.




An equilibrium is characterized by the ﬁrst order conditions for the households and ﬁrms
and by market clearing in the goods, labor and asset markets. Regarding the market for stocks of
ﬁrms, we follow Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) and Mendoza and Smith (2002) and assume that the
demand for domestic stocks is not inﬁnitely elastic. In particular, we assume that changes in the
position of domestic stocks can only be achieved through a reduction in stock prices to below their
fundamental price (implicitly we are assuming the existence of a risk neutral international stock
trader who faces an information processing cost so that she is willing to buy large amounts of stocks
of the domestic country only at a discount). This assumption generates the following international
























and a is a parameter reﬂecting the portfolio adjustment cost of the international trader. Equation
5 plus the equilibrium in the markets for stocks (st + s∗
t =1 )implies the following law of motion
21for domestic stocks











The goods market clearing condition requires that the production of the domestic goods is
equal to the domestic consumption plus exports. We assume that foreign expenditure on domestic
goods (denominated in foreign currency) is exogenously given (as in Céspedes et al., 2000) by xt so
the goods market clearing condition is
cH,t + ptxt = yt. (7)
A. The experiment
In this section we make assumptions about the functional forms and parameter values for the
model and conduct simple numerical policy experiments. For the utility function and aggregator of






















These preferences have the desirable property that they do not imply wealth eﬀects on labor supply.18
Many authors have documented that, especially in small open economy models, this property is
necessary for the model to reproduce the business cycle facts.19 The parameter v is set equal to
3.5 to generate a realistic wage elasticity of labor supply. The aggregator G is standard and we
set the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign good to the value of 1.2,w h i c h
18As pointed out by Mendoza (2002), in a one-good model these preferences would imply that the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and labor eﬀort would depend only on the marginal disutility of labor. In the
two-good model version of this paper however, the marginal rate of substitution depends also on the marginal utility
of the home good, which in turn depends on the relative price of the foreign good. Hence movements in the relative
price aﬀect labor supply.
19See for example Mendoza (1991), Correia et al. (1995), and Perri and Neumeyer (2001).
22lies in the middle of the range of empirical estimates for Europe and US (see Backus, Kehoe and
Kydland, 1994). The remaining parameters and initial conditions value are summarized in Table
20 below. Many of the parameter values are chosen to generate empirically plausible values for
steady state ratios (In particular import, export to output ratios plus labor shares) but for some
parameters (in particular a and κ) we have much less empirical guidance so we set them to arbitrary
values and we experiment with many possible values. Since our quantitative results do depend on
the particular parameter values, the ﬁndings we present are only suggestive and do not provide a
complete evaluation of the quantitative properties of the model. Some discussion on alternative
parameters and functional forms is provided below.
Table 20. Baseline parameter values
Name Symbol Value
Yearly discount factor β 0.9
International rate R 1/β
Labor exponent v 3.5
Labor share α 0.6
Risk Aversion σ 3
Elasticity of Substitution between cH and cF ρ 1.2
Share of foreign good ω 0.5
Adjustment costs of foreign trader a 1.0
Margin limit κ 0.1
Domestic stock owned by residents s0 90%
We consider the following experiment. We follow two economies, one with a high debt to
output ratio (65%) and one with a low debt to output ratio (45%). Up to period 0 we assume that
both economies are at their steady states and no margin constraint is imposed: we think of these as
23normal times. In period 1 domestic households face a large, unexpected but permanent decline in
export demand (xt is reduced by 20% )a n da tt h es a m et i m et h em a r g i nc o n s t r a i n ti si m p o s e do n
the economies. We believe this a simple way to capture two key elements of a crisis period, namely
the presence of negative real shocks and the reduction in conﬁdence of international investors. In
ﬁgure 6 we analyze the reaction to these shocks for the main macro variables in the two economies
and in a version of the high debt economy in which the margin constraint is not imposed (the dotted
line). We ﬁnd it useful to ﬁrst discuss the results for the latter economy as they give a measure of
the fundamental adjustments required in a world without the ﬁnancial friction. As exports fall the
demand for the domestic good will fall; if production were held constant then domestic consumption
would have to increase to absorb the entire output, but this increase in consumption can be achieved
only with a fall in the relative price of the domestic good. As the domestic good’s price drops,
its production will also drop and so will the labor income of domestic residents and the price of
domestic equity. As domestic residents are now poorer, they must also reduce consumption. Notice
that the debt to assets ratio −
ptbt+1
Rqtst+1 tof domestic consumers rises for two reasons: because the real
exchange rate pt increases and because the price of domestic equity falls. Finally observe that the
stock position of the domestic household is not changed and this implies (from 6) that the stock
price does not deviate from its fundamental level.
Consider now the same high-debt economy when the margin constraint is imposed, as shown
b yt h es o l i dl i n ei nF i g u r e6 .O b s e r v et h a tn o wt h ed e b tt oa s s e tr a t i oh a st ob er e d u c e dt os a t i s f y
the margin constraint. The reduction in debt is eﬀected via a fall in consumption and sales of
domestic stocks. Because of the preferences we have assumed, however, the output response and
export reduction are rather similar in the economies with and without the margin constraint. In
this context, market clearing (equation 7) implies that when consumption falls by more than in the
no-constraint case, the exchange rate must depreciate more: this is exchange rate overshooting.
24Similarly the market clearing condition for stock (equation 6) implies that the sales of domestic
stock force stock prices below their fundamental level: this is asset price overreaction.
In the economy with lower initial debt (the dashed line) the required reduction in consumption
and stock position is smaller and hence the overshooting and the overreaction are smaller.
To conclude, this simple model is consistent with evidence in the ﬁrst part of this paper that
relates the external debt burden to exchange rate overshooting. The model is not entirely consistent
with the evidence about output, as economies with diﬀerent levels of debt and diﬀerent real exchange
rate depreciation display rather quantitatively similar20 output drops while the data suggest that
countries with heavier debts and larger depreciations should suﬀer larger drops. One way to reconcile
the model and the data would be to assume that the causality runs in the opposite direction, that
is, greater overshooting is caused by larger export shocks that in turn cause deeper output drops.
Alternatively, one can think about mechanisms through which a friction in the ﬁnancial side of the
economy, such as a binding margin constraint, spills over into the real side, for example through a
reduction in investment or productivity, or also a reduction in the imports of an intermediate input
that enters the production function of the home good.
B. Exchange rate policy
The model we have analyzed so far suggests that the presence of margin constraints forces
domestic agents to sell domestic stocks at a discount (ﬁre sale) and this has negative consequences for
their long run consumption. This suggests a possible role for exchange rate policy. If real exchange
rate depreciation is contained, the debt to asset ratio remains lower and this can dampen the stock
ﬁre sale. At the same time though, avoiding the exchange rate depreciation has a negative demand
20The fact that output responses are, to some degree, similar across economies depends crucially on the preferences
we assumed. With preferences that display wealth eﬀects on labor supply (as Cobb Douglas in consumption and
leisure) the discrepancy between data and theory would be worse. The model in fact would predict that countries with
larger overshooting would actually be associated with smaller output drops, as the negative wealth eﬀect following the
shock would make labor supply and equilibrium employment increase.
25eﬀect and thus exacerbates the initial output drop. We can use a simple variant of our model to
analyze these issues more formally. As noted above, the economy we analyzed can be interpreted
as a ﬂexible exchange rates economy.
We now consider the same economy subject to the same shock but in which the real exchange
rate does not immediately adjust after the shock. In particular, in period 1 when agents learn about
the shock the real exchange rate is kept ﬁxed at the period 0 level, while in period 2 we let it
adjust freely. Notice that since in period 1 one price is ﬁxed, we cannot have market clearing in
all markets and we choose to leave labor markets in disequilibrium. In general, at the equilibrium
wage and consumption levels, the marginal utility of leisure will be lower than the marginal utility
of consumption times the wage, meaning that agents would be willing to work more but ﬁrms would
not hire them because there is not enough demand for their products. We will consider this as our
ﬁxed exchange rate economy.
In ﬁgure 7 the response to the same export shock for a ﬁxed (solid line) and for a ﬂexible
exchange rate (dashed line) economy is considered. Notice that in the ﬁxed exchange rate economy
there is no exchange rate movement on impact and this reduces the growth of the debt to asset ratio
and thus reduces the ﬁre sale of stocks (see the panel with the domestically held stocks). The fact
that the ﬁre sale is avoided allows domestic agent to maintain a higher consumption level in the long
run under the ﬁxed exchange rate regime (see the consumption panel). At the same time though,
under ﬁxed exchange rates, the foreign demand of domestic good is reduced more upon the impact
of the shock, and so output and domestic consumption drop more on impact. In general, which
exchange rate system is preferable from a welfare point of view is ambiguous but for most of the
parameters we have experimented with, our model implies that ﬁxed exchange rates are preferable.
This in contrast with the ﬁnding of Céspedes et al. (2000); the reason for the diﬀerent ﬁnding lies in
the presence of the margin constraint. In our model, as in theirs, the ﬁxed exchange rate does not
26eliminate the change in relative prices but only delays it, and as in theirs, the ﬁxed exchange rate
distorts labor markets. The diﬀerence is that in our model, the delay of the change in relative prices
is important as it reduces the distortionary impact of the margin constraint on the agent utility
proﬁle. Interestingly we also ﬁnd that keeping the exchange rate ﬁxed for more than one period is
always suboptimal, suggesting that in some cases the optimal exchange rate policy could be to keep
the exchange rate ﬁx in the initial periods of the crisis, allowing people to adjust their portfolios,
a n dt h e nl e ti tﬂoat.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we present a theoretical and empirical analysis of exchange rate overshooting,
balance sheet eﬀects and output contraction. Our empirical analysis suggests that overshooting of
the real exchange rate following currency crises is severe in countries with high levels of foreign debt
and that severe output contractions are associated with overshooting. The econometric estimates
can also be used to forecast the amount of exchange rate overshooting and output contraction to be
expected in ongoing episodes of turmoil.
The analytical framework shows that ﬁnancial distortions deriving from a lack of hedging
and margin constraints lead to overshooting of both real exchange rates and asset prices under
ﬂexible exchange rates once a crisis occurs. The margin constraint leads to a ﬁre sale of assets to
reduce foreign currency liability exposure and causes a negative wealth eﬀe c tt h a ta d v e r s e l ya ﬀects
long run consumption and welfare. Under ﬁxed exchange rates such a short-run overshooting of
the real exchange rate is prevented and thus the overshooting of equity prices is contained, at the
cost of a larger short-run contraction. This framework—unlike previous results in the literature on
ﬁxed versus ﬂexible exchange rates under liability dollarization—suggests that currency crises and
the sudden move to ﬂexible rates can be dominated by a policy of keeping the exchange rates ﬁxed,
at least for a period of time.
27There are many possible extensions of this work. First, one could consider a large sample of
currency crisis episodes. Second, one may want to test whether currency crises have diﬀerent eﬀects
when the capital account is heavily restricted and the domestic ﬁnancial system not liberalized;
this may imply comparing the overshooting and output eﬀects of currency crises in the 1990s when
capital markets were liberalized with those in previous decades when such liberalization had not
occurred yet and crises were driven more by current account developments than by capital account
developments. Also, as more and more emerging markets have adopted ﬂexible exchange rate regimes
in the last decade, one could make an integrated study of overshooting, balance sheet eﬀects and
the performance of ensuing ﬂexible exchange rate regimes. Finally, the model we consider is too
simple to capture the eﬀects of ﬁnancial frictions on the real side of the economy. One natural way
of doing so would be to explicitly model investment decisions. We leave these extensions to future
work.
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33Table 1:  Benchmark Regression Data 
 






Real GDP Change 
Source     BIS,  World 
Bank, IMF 
JP Morgan  JP Morgan    IFS, DRI 
Units      %  local/$, % of t0  local/$, % of t24  local/$, %  %  
              
 Brazil  Jan-99  28.2  4.8  37.0  43.6  3.8 
 Bulgaria  Mar-96  73.8  -9.9  142.1  118.2  -16.3 
 Czech    May-97  26.7  2.4  6.5  9.0  -4.4 
 Ecuador  Sep-98  82.4  43.3  51.1  116.5  -6.9 
 Finland Sep-92  45.2  10.0  13.0  24.2  -2.2 
 India  Oct-95  23.6  -6.8  22.0  13.7  7.0 
 Indonesia  Aug-97  52.3  22.4  155.3  212.3  -16.5 
 Israel  Oct-98  43.6  1.3  16.3  17.8  2.0 
 Italy  Sep-92  17.2  27.9  1.4  29.7  -1.9 
 Korea  Nov-97  27.4  22.6  32.8  62.9  -8.4 
 Malaysia  Aug-97  32.8  34.1  16.0  55.6  -8.9 
 Mexico  Dec-94  34.2  19.5  38.2  65.1  -8.0 
 Philippines  Aug-97  51.4  18.0  16.8  37.9  -1.1 
 Russia  Aug-98  42.9  56.5  28.9  101.8  -2.3 
 South  Africa  Jun-98  17.0  11.4  7.8  20.1  -0.3 
 South  Africa  Apr-96  13.7  0.3  10.5  10.8  4.1 
 Spain  Sep-92  13.8  22.1  3.3  26.2  -1.8 
 Sweden Nov-92  52.7  13.8  9.4  24.5  -3.0 
 Thailand  Jul-97  47.7  16.3  35.6  57.7  -13.4 
 Turkey  Jan-94  32.1  21.7  17.9  43.5  -11.6 
 Turkey  Feb-01  46.4  18.7  9.4  29.8  -9.5* 
 UK  Sep-92  14.1  14.5  5.2  20.4  2.2 
 Venezuela  Dec-95  71.4  9.9  41.0  54.9  -2.3 
              
 Average    38.7  16.3  31.2  52.0  -4.33 
  *Maximum drop after 1 year         
 Table 2:  OLS Regression 
 
Estimation Method: Ordinary Least Squares 
Included observations: 23 
 Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
α1  -11.99915 15.82278 -0.758347 0.4525 
α2  1.115920 0.366150 3.047713 0.0040 
β1  21.88785 6.041304 3.623034 0.0008 
β2  -3.663324 0.832472 -4.400539 0.0001 
      
Equation: OVERSHOOT =α1+α2*NET_DEBT 
R-squared  0.306669     Mean dependent var  31.20698 
Adjusted R-squared  0.273653     S.D. dependent var  39.54485 
S.E. of regression  33.70249     Sum squared resid  23853.02 
        
Equation: GDP = β1+β2*log(NET_DEBT*TOTAL_DEPRECIATION) 
R-squared  0.479744     Mean dependent var  -4.338188 
Adjusted R-squared  0.454970     S.D. dependent var  6.427339 
S.E. of regression  4.745058     Sum squared resid  472.8270 
        
 
 
Table 3:  Benchmark IV Regression 
 
Estimation Method: Three-Stage Least Squares 
Included observations: 23 
Instruments: NET_DEBT NET_DEBT*FUND NET_DEBT^2 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^2 
                     NET_DEBT^3 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^3 C 
 Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
α1  -13.37570 14.98749 -0.892458 0.3772
α2  1.151473 0.346068 3.327306 0.0018
β1  19.45707 6.169206 3.153902 0.0030
β2  -3.323787 0.851493 -3.903481 0.0003
      
Equation: OVERSHOOT =α1+α2*NET_DEBT 
R-squared  0.306358     Mean dependent var  31.20698
Adjusted R-squared  0.273327     S.D. dependent var  39.54485
S.E. of regression  33.71006     Sum squared resid  23863.73
        
Equation: GDP = β1+β2*log(NET_DEBT*TOTAL_DEPRECIATION) 
R-squared  0.475623     Mean dependent var  -4.338188
Adjusted R-squared  0.450652     S.D. dependent var  6.427339
S.E. of regression  4.763815     Sum squared resid  476.5726
        
 
 
 Table 4:  Robustness to 1-Year Capital Buildup 
 
Estimation Method: Three-Stage Least Squares 
Included observations: 23 
Instruments: NET_DEBT NET_DEBT*FUND NET_DEBT^2 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^2 
                     NET_DEBT^3 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^3 CAP_BUILDUP1YR 
                     CAP_BUILDUP1YR^2 CAP_BUILDUP1YR^3 C 
 Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
α1  -13.87617 14.93814 -0.928909 0.3584 
α2  1.164399 0.344642 3.378580 0.0016 
β1  25.32170 6.457936 3.921020 0.0003 
β2  -3.891497 0.838818 -4.639260 0.0000 
β3  -0.158864 0.088862 -1.787763 0.0812 
      
Equation: OVERSHOOT = α1+α2*NET_DEBT 
R-squared  0.306090     Mean dependent var  31.20698 
Adjusted R-squared  0.273047     S.D. dependent var  39.54485 
S.E. of regression  33.71656     Sum squared resid  23872.93 
        
Equation: GDP = β1+β2*log(NET_DEBT*TOTAL_DEPRECIATION) 
        + β3*CAP_BUILDUP1YR 
R-squared  0.519182     Mean dependent var  -4.338188 
Adjusted R-squared  0.471100     S.D. dependent var  6.427339 
S.E. of regression  4.674316     Sum squared resid  436.9846 
        
CAP_BUILDUP1YR is the inflow of capital divided by GDP in the year preceding a crisis. 
 Table 5:  Robustness to 3-Year Capital Buildup in Equation 2 
 
Estimation Method: Three-Stage Least Squares 
Included observations: 23 
Instruments: NET_DEBT NET_DEBT*FUND NET_DEBT^2 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^2 
                     NET_DEBT^3 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^3 CAP_BUILDUP3YR 
                     CAP_BUILDUP3YR^2 CAP_BUILDUP3YR^3 C 
 Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
α1  -14.43728 14.99548 -0.962776 0.3413 
α2  1.178891 0.346298 3.404264 0.0015 
β1  26.91852 6.202966 4.339621 0.0001 
β2  -4.125275 0.812881 -5.074883 0.0000 
β3  -0.443956 0.239560 -1.853212 0.0711 
      
Equation: OVERSHOOT = α1+α2*NET_DEBT 
R-squared  0.305692     Mean dependent var  31.20698 
Adjusted R-squared  0.272630     S.D. dependent var  39.54485 
S.E. of regression  33.72622     Sum squared resid  23886.61 
        
Equation: GDP = β1+β2*log(NET_DEBT*TOTAL_DEPRECIATION) 
        + β3*CAP_BUILDUP3YR 
R-squared  0.536790     Mean dependent var  -4.338188 
Adjusted R-squared  0.490469     S.D. dependent var  6.427339 
S.E. of regression  4.587927     Sum squared resid  420.9814 
        
CAP_BUILDUP3YR is the inflow of capital divided by GDP in the 3 years preceding a crisis. Table 6:  Robustness to 3-Year Capital Buildup in Both Equations 
 
Estimation Method: Three-Stage Least Squares 
Included observations: 23 
Instruments: NET_DEBT NET_DEBT*FUND NET_DEBT^2 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^2 
                     NET_DEBT^3 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^3 CAP_BUILDUP3YR 
                     CAP_BUILDUP3YR^2 CAP_BUILDUP3YR^3 C 
 Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
α1  -11.89909 19.22432 -0.618960 0.5395 
α2  1.153247 0.366061 3.150427 0.0031 
α3  -0.398048 1.908168 -0.208602 0.8358 
β1  26.76062 6.252396 4.280059 0.0001 
β2  -4.111412 0.815947 -5.038823 0.0000 
β3  -0.428848 0.250416 -1.712546 0.0945 
      
Equation: OVERSHOOT = α1+α2*NET_DEBT+α3*CAP_BUILDUP3YR 
R-squared  0.307791     Mean dependent var  31.20698 
Adjusted R-squared  0.238570     S.D. dependent var  39.54485 
S.E. of regression  34.50682     Sum squared resid  23814.41 
        
Equation: GDP = β1+β2*log(NET_DEBT*TOTAL_DEPRECIATION) 
        + β3*CAP_BUILDUP3YR 
R-squared  0.536945     Mean dependent var  -4.338188 
Adjusted R-squared  0.490640     S.D. dependent var  6.427339 
S.E. of regression  4.587158     Sum squared resid  420.8405 
        
CAP_BUILDUP3YR is the inflow of capital divided by GDP in the 3 years preceding a crisis.Table 7:  Robustness to Capital Reversal in Equation 2 
 
Estimation Method: Three-Stage Least Squares 
Included observations: 23 
Instruments: NET_DEBT NET_DEBT*FUND NET_DEBT^2 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^2 
                     NET_DEBT^3 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^3 CAPITAL_REVERSAL 
                     CAPITAL_REVERSAL^2 CAPITAL_REVERSAL^3 C 
 Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
α1  -11.91285 15.09137 -0.789382 0.4344 
α2  1.113691 0.349066 3.190485 0.0027 
β1  16.58569 5.155844 3.216871 0.0025 
β2  -2.576168 0.758153 -3.397953 0.0015 
β3  0.543690 0.163419 3.326967 0.0019 
      
Equation: OVERSHOOT = α1+α2*NET_DEBT 
R-squared  0.306668     Mean dependent var  31.20698 
Adjusted R-squared  0.273652     S.D. dependent var  39.54485 
S.E. of regression  33.70252     Sum squared resid  23853.06 
        
Equation: GDP = β1+β2*log(NET_DEBT*TOTAL_DEPRECIATION) 
        +β3*CAPITAL_REVERSAL 
R-squared  0.672450     Mean dependent var  -4.338188 
Adjusted R-squared  0.639695     S.D. dependent var  6.427339 
S.E. of regression  3.858035     Sum squared resid  297.6887 
         
CAPITAL_REVERSAL is the capital inflow in the year following a crisis minus the  
capital inflow in the year preceding a crisis, all divided by pre-crisis GDP. Table 8:  Robustness to Capital Reversal in Equations 1 and 2 
 
Estimation Method: Three-Stage Least Squares 
Included observations: 23 
Instruments: NET_DEBT NET_DEBT*FUND NET_DEBT^2 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^2 
                     NET_DEBT^3 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^3 CAPITAL_REVERSAL 
                     CAPITAL_REVERSAL^2 CAPITAL_REVERSAL^3 C 
 Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
α1  -18.77232 14.52591 -1.292333 0.2037 
α2  1.020647 0.328846 3.103724 0.0035 
α3  -2.292753 1.224884 -1.871812 0.0686 
β1  16.55953 5.153975 3.212963 0.0026 
β2  -2.539387 0.758146 -3.349469 0.0018 
β3  0.595665 0.166091 3.586372 0.0009 
      
Equation: OVERSHOOT = α1+α2*NET_DEBT+α3*CAPITAL_REVERSAL 
R-squared  0.398239     Mean dependent var  31.20698 
Adjusted R-squared  0.338063     S.D. dependent var  39.54485 
S.E. of regression  32.17350     Sum squared resid  20702.68 
      
Equation: GDP = β1+β2*log(NET_DEBT*TOTAL_DEPRECIATION) 
        +β3*CAPITAL_REVERSAL 
R-squared  0.674267     Mean dependent var  -4.338188 
Adjusted R-squared  0.641694     S.D. dependent var  6.427339 
S.E. of regression  3.847322     Sum squared resid  296.0377 
       
CAPITAL_REVERSAL is the capital inflow in the year following a crisis minus the  


















 Table 9:  Robustness to Real Credit Contraction in Both Equations  
 
Estimation Method: Three-Stage Least Squares 
Included observations: 22 
Instruments: NET_DEBT NET_DEBT*FUND NET_DEBT^2 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^2 
                     NET_DEBT^3 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^3 REAL_CRED2YR 
                     REAL_CRED2YR^2 REAL_CRED2YR^3 C 
 Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
α1  -5.628787 14.51553 -0.387777 0.7003 
α2  0.886009 0.361986 2.447634 0.0191 
α3  -0.441727 0.236780 -1.865556 0.0698 
β1  15.16812 6.339020 2.392817 0.0218 
β2  -2.615061 0.899265 -2.907997 0.0060 
β3  0.064378 0.035552 1.810832 0.0781 
      
Equation: OVERSHOOT = α1+α2*NET_DEBT+α3* REAL_CRED2YR 
R-squared  0.424662     Mean dependent var  32.20044 
Adjusted R-squared  0.364100     S.D. dependent var  40.18060 
S.E. of regression  32.04135     Sum squared resid  19506.32 
      
Equation: GDP = β1+β2*log(NET_DEBT*TOTAL_DEPRECIATION) 
        +β3*REAL_CRED2YR 
R-squared  0.546941     Mean dependent var  -4.103560 
Adjusted R-squared  0.499250     S.D. dependent var  6.476992 
S.E. of regression  4.583357     Sum squared resid  399.1361 
       
Turkey 2001 is excluded from this regression because its real credit data for 2003 were not yet  
available.  REAL_CRED2YR is the percent change in real credit to the private sector over the two  
years following a crisis. Table 10:  Endogeneity of All Banking Crises and Balance Sheet Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: BANKCRISIS 
Method: ML - Binary Probit 
Included observations: 23 
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error  z-Statistic  Prob. 
C -0.951034  0.509448  -1.866793  0.0619 
NET_DEBT*TOTAL_ 
DEPRECIATION 
0.000570  0.000280  2.033158  0.0420 
Mean dependent var  0.521739     S.D. dependent var  0.510754 
S.E. of regression  0.423653     Akaike info criterion  1.167932 
Sum squared resid  3.769114     Schwarz criterion  1.266670 
Log likelihood  -11.43121     Hannan-Quinn criter.  1.192764 
Restr. log likelihood  -15.92064     Avg. log likelihood  -0.497009 
LR statistic (1 df)  8.978850     McFadden R-squared  0.281988 
Probability(LR stat)  0.002731      
Obs with Dep=0  11      Total obs  23 
Obs with Dep=1  12    
BANKCRISIS is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if there is a banking crisis concurrent with or 




Table 11:  Endogeneity of Subsequent Banking Crises and Balance Sheet Effects 
 
Dependent Variable: BANKCRISIS 
Method: ML - Binary Probit 
Included observations: 23 
Variable Coefficient  Std. Error  z-Statistic  Prob. 
C  -1.226068 0.417497 -2.936712 0.0033 
NET_DEBT*TOTAL_ 
DEPRECIATION 
0.000150 9.07E-05 1.653353 0.0983 
Mean dependent var  0.217391     S.D. dependent var  0.421741 
S.E. of regression  0.402456     Akaike info criterion  1.100182 
Sum squared resid  3.401386     Schwarz criterion  1.198921 
Log likelihood  -10.65210     Hannan-Quinn criter.  1.125015 
Restr. log likelihood  -12.04249     Avg. log likelihood  -0.463135 
LR statistic (1 df)  2.780780     McFadden R-squared  0.115457 
Probability(LR stat)  0.095402      
Obs with Dep=0  18      Total obs  23 
Obs with Dep=1  5   
BANKCRISIS is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a banking crisis follows the currency crisis  
and 0 if not.   Table 12:  Robustness to Competitiveness Effects 
 
Estimation Method: Three-Stage Least Squares 
Included observations: 23 
Instruments: NET_DEBT NET_DEBT*FUND NET_DEBT^2 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^2 
                     NET_DEBT^3 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^3 C 
 Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
α1  -12.54698 15.09545 -0.831176 0.4106 
α2  1.130069 0.349184 3.236316 0.0024 
β1  0.988273 1.824890 0.541552 0.5910 
β2  -0.102417 0.029597 -3.460328 0.0013 
      
Equation: OVERSHOOT = α1+α2*NET_DEBT 
R-squared  0.306619     Mean dependent var  31.20698 
Adjusted R-squared  0.273601     S.D. dependent var  39.54485 
S.E. of regression  33.70369     Sum squared resid  23854.71 
        
Equation: GDP = β1+β2*TOTAL_DEPRECIATION 
R-squared  0.438603     Mean dependent var  -4.338188 
Adjusted R-squared  0.411870     S.D. dependent var  6.427339 
S.E. of regression  4.929102     Sum squared resid  510.2170 
        Table 13:  Robustness to World Growth 
 
Estimation Method: Three-Stage Least Squares 
Included observations: 23 
Instruments: NET_DEBT NET_DEBT*FUND NET_DEBT^2 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^2 
                     NET_DEBT^3 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^3 WORLD_GROWTH 
                     WORLD_GROWTH^2 WORLD_GROWTH^3 C 
 Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
α1  -13.02014 14.88823 -0.874526 0.3869 
α2  1.142290 0.343198 3.328373 0.0019 
β1  14.38180 6.107805 2.354659 0.0234 
β2  -3.694019 0.838602 -4.404974 0.0001 
β3  2.908666 1.354341 2.147661 0.0377 
      
Equation: OVERSHOOT = α1+α2*NET_DEBT 
R-squared  0.306498     Mean dependent var  31.20698 
Adjusted R-squared  0.273474     S.D. dependent var  39.54485 
S.E. of regression  33.70665     Sum squared resid  23858.91 
      
Equation: GDP = β1+β2*log(NET_DEBT*TOTAL_DEPRECIATION) 
        +β3*WORLD_GROWTH 
R-squared  0.517033     Mean dependent var  -4.338188 
Adjusted R-squared  0.468736     S.D. dependent var  6.427339 
S.E. of regression  4.684750     Sum squared resid  438.9377 
       
WORLD_GROWTH is the annual average percent GDP growth for the world in during the 2 years 
following a crisis. Table 14:  Robustness to Redefining Net Debt 
 
Estimation Method: Three-Stage Least Squares 
Included observations: 23 
Instruments: NET_DEBT2 NET_DEBT2*FUND NET_DEBT2^2 
(NET_DEBT2*FUND)^2 
                     NET_DEBT2^3 (NET_DEBT2*FUND)^3 C 
 Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
α1  -3.483347 11.94435 -0.291631 0.7720 
α2  1.197965 0.344246 3.479966 0.0012 
β1  8.913907 5.142128 1.733506 0.0903 
β2  -1.976955 0.749685 -2.637048 0.0117 
      
Equation: OVERSHOOT = α1+α2*NET_DEBT2 
R-squared  0.334281     Mean dependent var  31.20698 
Adjusted R-squared  0.302580     S.D. dependent var  39.54485 
S.E. of regression  33.02457     Sum squared resid  22903.07 
        
Equation: GDP = β1+β2*log(NET_DEBT2*TOTAL_DEPRECIATION) 
R-squared  0.305394     Mean dependent var  -4.338188 
Adjusted R-squared  0.272318     S.D. dependent var  6.427339 
S.E. of regression  5.482797     Sum squared resid  631.2824 
        
NET_DEBT2 is gross external debt minus external assets of the government, bank, and  
corporate sectors as a share of GDP. Table 15:  Robustness to Redefining the Equilibrium REER at 36 Months 
 
Estimation Method: Three-Stage Least Squares 
Included observations: 23 
Instruments: NET_DEBT NET_DEBT*FUND2 NET_DEBT^2 
(NET_DEBT*FUND2)^2 
                     NET_DEBT^3 (NET_DEBT*FUND2)^3 C 
 Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
α1  -19.14378 11.64529 -1.643907 0.1077 
α2  1.352164 0.269107 5.024625 0.0000 
β1  18.75092 6.198007 3.025314 0.0042 
β2  -3.225149 0.855562 -3.769624 0.0005 
      
Equation: OVERSHOOT2 = α1+α2*NET_DEBT 
R-squared  0.514180     Mean dependent var  33.20924 
Adjusted R-squared  0.491045     S.D. dependent var  36.59329 
S.E. of regression  26.10604     Sum squared resid  14312.03 
        
Equation: GDP = β1+β2*log(NET_DEBT*TOTAL_DEPRECIATION) 
R-squared  0.472880     Mean dependent var  -4.338188 
Adjusted R-squared  0.447779     S.D. dependent var  6.427339 
S.E. of regression  4.776255     Sum squared resid  479.0649 
        
In this specification, the equilibrium real effective exchange rate is defined as the REER  






 Table 16:  Robustness to Redefining the Equilibrium REER as 5-Year Average 
 
Estimation Method: Three-Stage Least Squares 
Included observations: 23 
Instruments: NET_DEBT NET_DEBT*FUND3 NET_DEBT^2 
(NET_DEBT*FUND3)^2 
                     NET_DEBT^3 (NET_DEBT*FUND3)^3 C 
 Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
α1  1.752448 11.90531 0.147199 0.8837 
α2  0.839402 0.274828 3.054279 0.0039 
β1  18.79104 6.102285 3.079345 0.0036 
β2  -3.230754 0.842075 -3.836659 0.0004 
      
Equation: OVERSHOOT3 = α1+α2*NET_DEBT 
R-squared  0.273806     Mean dependent var  34.25236 
Adjusted R-squared  0.239225     S.D. dependent var  30.72834 
S.E. of regression  26.80201     Sum squared resid  15085.30 
        
Equation: GDP = β1+β2*log(NET_DEBT*TOTAL_DEPRECIATION) 
R-squared  0.473055     Mean dependent var  -4.338188 
Adjusted R-squared  0.447962     S.D. dependent var  6.427339 
S.E. of regression  4.775465     Sum squared resid  478.9063 
        
In this specification, the equilibrium real effective exchange rate is defined as the REER  
prevailing in the 5 years surrounding a crisis.  Specifically, it is the average REER in the  
3 years before and the 2 years after a crisis. Table 17:  Robustness to Redefining Overshooting 
 
Estimation Method: Three-Stage Least Squares 
Included observations: 23 
Instruments: NET_DEBT NET_DEBT*FUND NET_DEBT^2 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^2 
                     NET_DEBT^3 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^3 C 
 Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
α1  -78.86921 120.2847 -0.655688 0.5156 
α2  6.439816 2.782932 2.314040 0.0256 
β1  19.58942 6.229403 3.144671 0.0031 
β2  -3.342274 0.860002 -3.886357 0.0004 
      
Equation: OVERSHOOT4 = α1+α2*NET_DEBT 
R-squared  0.184033     Mean dependent var  170.4672 
Adjusted R-squared  0.145177     S.D. dependent var  290.2406 
S.E. of regression  268.3467     Sum squared resid  1512209. 
        
Equation: GDP = β1+β2*log(NET_DEBT*TOTAL_DEPRECIATION) 
R-squared  0.476059     Mean dependent var  -4.338188 
Adjusted R-squared  0.451110     S.D. dependent var  6.427339 
S.E. of regression  4.761831     Sum squared resid  476.1758 
        
In this specification, overshooting is defined as the sum of REER deviations from the equilibrium  
REER during the 24 months following a crisis.  Table 18:  Robustness to Redefining Overshooting and Total Depreciation 
 
Estimation Method: Three-Stage Least Squares 
Included observations: 23 
Instruments: NET_DEBT NET_DEBT*FUND NET_DEBT^2 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^2 
                     NET_DEBT^3 (NET_DEBT*FUND)^3 C 
 Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
α1  -66.27730 120.2045 -0.551371 0.5843 
α2  6.114595 2.780619 2.199005 0.0334 
β1  -1.561431 1.663299 -0.938755 0.3532 
β2  -0.000104 4.50E-05 -2.311960 0.0258 
      
Equation: OVERSHOOT4 = α1+α2*NET_DEBT 
R-squared  0.183830     Mean dependent var  170.4672 
Adjusted R-squared  0.144965     S.D. dependent var  290.2406 
S.E. of regression  268.3800     Sum squared resid  1512585. 
        
Equation: GDP = β1+β2*log(NET_DEBT*TOTAL_DEPRECIATION2) 
R-squared  0.229308     Mean dependent var  -4.338188 
Adjusted R-squared  0.192608     S.D. dependent var  6.427339 
S.E. of regression  5.775284     Sum squared resid  700.4320 
        
In this specification, overshooting is defined as the sum of REER deviations from the equilibrium  
REER during the 24 months following a crisis.  Total depreciation is defined as the sum of percent 
deviations of the REER from the t0 level during the 24 months following a crisis. Table 19:  Robustness to Redefining the Equilibrium REER as 5-Year Pre-Crisis 
Average 
 
Estimation Method: Three-Stage Least Squares 
Included observations: 23 
Instruments: NET_DEBT NET_DEBT*FUND4 NET_DEBT^2 (NET_DEBT*FUND4)^2 
                     NET_DEBT^3 (NET_DEBT*FUND4)^3 C 
 Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
α1  8.436805 18.35294 0.459698 0.6481
α2  0.915940 0.424259 2.158918 0.0366
β1  17.30153 6.715887 2.576209 0.0136
β2  -3.022695 0.928518 -3.255397 0.0022
      
Equation: OVERSHOOT5 =α1+α2*NET_DEBT 
R-squared  0.167332     Mean dependent var  43.90013
Adjusted R-squared  0.127681     S.D. dependent var  43.98719
S.E. of regression  41.08317     Sum squared resid  35444.36
      
Equation: GDP = β1+β2*log(NET_DEBT*TOTAL_DEPRECIATION) 
R-squared  0.465073     Mean dependent var  -4.338188
Adjusted R-squared  0.439600     S.D. dependent var  6.427339
S.E. of regression  4.811499     Sum squared resid  486.1609
        
In this specification, the equilibrium REER is defined as the average REER during the 5 years 
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Figure 1a:  Real Effective Exchange Rates for "Asian Style" Crises, t0=100
Turkey, November 1993
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Indonesia, July 1997
Korea, September 1997
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Figure 1b:  Real Effective Exchange Rates for "European Style" Crises, t0=100
Finland, August 1992 Spain, August 1992 Italy, August 1992
UK, August 1992 Sweden, October 1992 Czech Republic, April 1997
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Figure 1c:  Real Effective Exchange Rates for "Other Style" Crises, t0=100
India, August 1995 Bulgaria, February 1996
South Africa, March 1996 Israel, July 1996
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Figure 4. Frequency distribution of α
























Figure 5. Frequency distribution of β
































Figure 6. Effects of a 20% permanent reduction in export expenditure
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Figure 7. Effects of a reduction in export expenditure: Flex v/s Fixed
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